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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has 7.2 million adults in prison or under correc-
tional supervision, accounting for some 3.1% of the population.1  
Ninety-five percent of these convicts will eventually return home and 
begin to encounter “hidden” consequences.2  Our economic, legal, 
and regulatory schemes systematically marginalize people with crimi-
nal records by imposing penalties on ex-offenders that are commonly 
described as the “collateral consequences of criminal convictions.”  
The term “collateral consequences” refers to the denial of rights, priv-
ileges, benefits, and opportunities in addition to the sanctions im-
posed by the original criminal sentence.  Many of these consequences 
haunt ex-offenders for the rest of their lives. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES’ IMPACT ON 
CONVICTED 
The issue of collateral consequences is one of the most hotly de-
bated topics among practitioners, lawmakers, and academics.  A per-
sistent problem in studying the issue is the inability of any of these 
groups, let alone the general public, to determine the sheer volume 
and scope of these penalties.  In the fall of 2009, the National Institute 
of Justice awarded the American Bar Association (ABA) a grant to 
address this issue and develop a comprehensive national database of 
consequences on a state-by-state basis. 
A. Defining “Collateral Consequences” 
Collateral consequences are codified in state and federal statutory 
codes and administrative regulations.  They attach by operation of 
law or through an act of a government entity,3 such as an administra-
tive body, government official, or civil court.  Unfortunately, the term 
“collateral consequences” defies accurate definition and categoriza-
 
 1. Total Correctional Population, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=11 (last visited Oct. 
27, 2011). 
 2. Timothy Hughes & Doris James Wilson, Reentry Trends in the United States, 
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS: BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj. 
gov/content/reentry/reentry.cfm (last visited Oct. 27, 2011) (based on 2002 survey re-
port).  
 3. For the purposes of this Article, a “government entity” encompasses any ex-
ecutive, legislative, or judicial body exercising adjudicatory authority over the rights, 
privileges, benefits, or opportunities of an ex-offender.  This definition includes state 
and federal civil courts, public officials, executive agencies and independent agencies, 
but it specifically excludes any criminal sentencing court. 
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tion.  The jurisprudence on the matter does not seek to identify the 
phenomenon or fix its boundaries.  Rather, the law has developed 
from an effort to maximize the authority of regulatory bodies and 
protect the finality of guilty plea convictions by minimizing the duties 
of actors within the criminal justice system.4 
Collateral consequences can be classified as automatic collateral 
sanctions or discretionary disqualifications.  Automatic collateral 
sanctions are penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages automatically 
imposed on an individual as a result of a conviction.5  These sanctions 
attach by operation of law or through the non-discretionary act of a 
government entity following notice of conviction.  On the other hand, 
discretionary disqualifications are not mandatory.  A government en-
tity is authorized—but not required—to impose the consequence on 
an ex-offender because of a conviction.6 
Both automatic and discretionary consequences raise troubling 
questions about the fairness of these penalties and the procedures 
used to impose them.  Automatic sanctions are necessarily overbroad, 
but they are uniformly applied and provide notice to the public of the 
penalties inevitably resulting from conviction.  These sanctions penal-
ize ex-offenders whose convictions might otherwise be mitigated by 
the factual circumstances of their criminal behavior, the passage of 
time, or through their efforts toward rehabilitation.  On the other 
hand, discretionary disqualifications nominally protect against the 
risk of unjustified application by authorizing the government entity to 
hear evidence and determine whether the penalty is appropriate in 
any particular case.  Agency discretion, however, introduces the risk 
of unpredictable or arbitrary applications of penalties. 
Before hearing evidence on an individual ex-offender, the govern-
ment entity determines whether the legislature authorizes it to sanc-
 
 4. See AMBER HARDESTY, OHIO LEGISLATIVE SERV. COMM’N, BILL ANALYSIS, 
H.B. 169, 129th Gen. Assemb. (2011) (summarizing the expansive number of occupa-
tions over which the different regulatory boards exercise authority over granting, 
denying, or revoking a license), http://www.lsc.state.oh.us/analyses129/h0169-i-
129.pdf; see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 670.280 (West 2009); Margaret Colgate 
Love, Relief from the Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction: A State-by-
State Resource Guide, SENTENCING PROJECT (Dec. 16 2005), http://www.sentencing 
project.org/doc/File/Collateral%20Consequences/execsumm.pdf. 
 5. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THIRD EDITION: COLLATERAL 
SANCTIONS & DISCRETIONARY DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSS., Standard 
19-1.1 (2004), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_ 
justice_section_archive/crimjust_standards_collateral_blk.html#1.1 [hereinafter ABA 
COLLATERAL SANCTIONS STANDARDS]. 
 6. Id. 
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tion people convicted of the offense at issue.  The government entity 
makes this categorical determination by interpreting the language of 
its authorizing statute and deciding whether the offense falls within its 
permissible scope of authority.7  While the authority to hear evidence 
and make individualized determinations addresses the concern that 
automatic sanctions are overbroad, the categorical determination is 
fraught with uncertainty. 
If the government entity has yet to decide whether a particular of-
fense is within the scope of the authorizing statute, a defense attorney 
in plea negotiations may find it impossible to predict whether conse-
quences may attach and how to advise the client accordingly.  This is 
especially true where the statute is vague or delegates to the agency 
the power to define the scope of its own authority.  For instance, au-
thorizing statutes commonly define a criminal offense as one “reason-
ably related to the profession.”8  If there is no controlling authority on 
point, a defense attorney’s analysis of whether a particular offense 
would subject a client to sanctions becomes an exercise in mind-
reading or guesswork. 
The duration for which collateral consequence statutes are en-
forced varies.  Some range from a few months to many years, while 
others simply do not indicate whether the consequence will expire at 
all.9  Two types of statutes are understood to mean that the conse-
quence can last forever: statutes that explicitly state that the conse-
 
 7. For example, in Vermont, the statutory language states, “[t]he following con-
duct by a licensed podiatrist constitutes unprofessional conduct. When that conduct is 
by an applicant or person who later becomes an applicant, it may constitute grounds 
for denial of licensure: . . . conviction of a crime related to the profession.” Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 26, § 375 (b)(5) (West 2003) (amended 2011).  Iowa’s code provides that the 
state fire marshal shall 
[r]evoke, suspend, or refuse any license granted pursuant to this chapter 
when the licensee fails or refuses to pay an examination, license, or renewal 
fee required by law or when the licensee is guilty of any of the following acts 
or omissions: . . . Conviction of a felony related to the profession or occupa-
tion of the licensee. 
IOWA CODE § 100D.5(2)(e) (2010). 
 8. See, e.g., ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 536-X-7.01(4)(2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
436B-10(a)(5) (2010); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15/15.1 (West 2011); IOWA CODE § 
100D.5(2)(e) (2011); OHIO ADMIN. CODE 4765-8-01(A)(11) (2011); 63 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 485.21(15) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 375 (West 2003) 
(amended 2011). 
 9. Compare ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-51-609 (West 2011) (which does not state any 
duration for the consequence), with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 41(A)(5) (West 2010) 
(repealed 2011) (specifying that the duration is for seven years). 
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quence is indefinite10 and statutes that give no indication of expiration 
even if an administrative board has the discretion to cut it short.11 
Moreover, some collateral sanctions remove potential workers 
from the employment market even though ex-offenders, employers, 
and consumers could all benefit from less regulation.  In some in-
stances, collateral bars to employment prevent someone who was 
trained for a job while incarcerated—at taxpayers’ expense—from 
taking the very job for which he or she was trained.12  
The systematic application of collateral consequences in the United 
States interferes with ex-offenders’ successful rehabilitation and re-
entry into society.  This leads to increased recidivism, inadequately 
protects public safety, and contributes to the nation’s incarceration 
rate, which is the highest in the world.13  Whether it was the war on 
drugs, “get tough on crime” campaigns, mandatory minimums, or any 
of the other programs implemented during the past twenty years, the 
results have, for the most part, been the same: the United States still 
has the largest prison population in the world and the highest rates of 
recidivism.14  Furthermore, these policies disproportionally affect mi-
nority populations, males, and the young.15 
Lawmakers employing crime deterrence policies have made stricter 
laws and longer sentences, and have strengthened the ability of police 
to vigorously investigate all types of criminal activity.  But testimony 
given by Stephen Saltzburg before the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission on behalf of the ABA suggests that removing bar-
riers to employment and government services may better serve the 
 
 10. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 266 (West 1999). 
 11. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 410/4-7 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 1, § 35 (West 2008). 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. Roy Walmsley, World Prison Population List (Eighth Edition), KING’S COLL. 
LONDON: INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES (Jan. 2009), http://www.prisonstudies.org/ 
info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Collateral Costs: Incarcerations Impact on Economic Mobility, PEW CHARI-
TABLE TRUSTS, 4 (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploaded 
Files/Collateral_Costs.pdf?n=8653 [hereinafter Collateral Costs]. 
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community.16  The achievement of short-term employment reduced 
recidivism rates of ex-offenders by as much as 58%.17  
Aside from the substantial economic burden to tax payers—over 
fifty billion dollars a year—incarceration carries far-reaching eco-
nomic and social externalities for ex-offenders, families, and commu-
nities.  The ABA data shows that, nationwide, thousands of statutes 
operate to deny an employment opportunity to people with criminal 
records.18  Even though an ex-offender “pays his debt to society” by 
successfully completing the criminal sentence and community super-
vision imposed on him, the punishment continues long after the jailer 
puts the ex-offender on a bus home.19  These statutes add a large 
piece to the employment puzzle, which is in addition to that created 
by the thousands of unregulated employers who deny employment to 
those with a criminal record.20 
Recidivism will remain uncontrolled so long as ex-offenders are 
systematically denied employment opportunities—no matter how 
draconian criminal sentences become or how vigorously law enforce-
ment works to investigate criminal activity.  Without the opportunity 
to work for an “honest dollar,” ex-offenders are faced with the Hob-
son’s choice of returning to criminal activity to support themselves 
and provide for their families.  For those ex-offenders fortunate 
enough to find work, they can expect to be paid 11% less in wages 
than an individual without a criminal conviction.21  Allowing access to 
employment would enhance public safety by addressing a key con-
tributor to recidivist criminal activity and giving the ex-offender an 
opportunity to rehabilitate. 
 
 16. Stephen Saltzberg, The Use of Criminal Records for Employment Screening 
Background Checks, ABA (July 26, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/uncategorized/2011/2011july26_stephensaltzburgeeoc_t.authcheckdam.pdf (stat-
ing that barriers to employment result in higher recidivism rates and that if “a former 
offender cannot support himself or herself with honest employment, criminal activity 
is unfortunately more likely to result”). 
 17.  The Statistics, SAFER FOUNDATION, http://www.saferfoundation.org/news-
views/the-statistics (last visited Oct. 28, 2011) (citing a recidivism study by Loyola 
University in Chicago).  
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. Collateral Costs, supra note 15, at 11. 
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B. Operational Effect of Automatic and Discretionary 
Collateral Consequences 
The jurisprudence concerning collateral consequences developed 
to protect several interests.  One interest is to protect the state’s au-
thority to regulate commercial activity.  Another interest is to pre-
serve the efficiency and finality of guilty plea convictions against con-
stitutional challenges based on the double jeopardy clause22 and other 
protections afforded to criminal defendants.  The judicial opinions 
promoting the state interest in effective governance over the funda-
mental rights of criminal defendants weakened the very constitutional 
protections that criminal defendants and ex-offenders asserted.  This 
phenomenon may be observed in the formalistic distinctions made 
between direct criminal punishments and collateral consequences in 
the progeny of Strickland23 and Hill.24  If it develops in Justice Ste-
ven’s absence, the Padilla decision may serve as a turning point in this 
line of cases—where the goals of preserving the state’s authority to 
regulate commercial activity and continually fill its prisons begins to 
succumb to the weight of the fundamental rights guaranteed to crimi-
nal defendants by the Constitution.  Indeed, the shift in Padilla from 
describing consequences as “collateral” to recognizing them as “inte-
gral” signified a fundamental shift in the Court’s analysis and has 
brought it more in line with the reality faced by people with criminal 
records.25   With Padilla in its infancy, however, ex-offenders continue 
to struggle with criminal penalties disguised as benign economic regu-
lations. 
The state’s duty to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citi-
zens generally trumps an individual’s right to enter a chosen profes-
sion.26  Courts grant the legislature broad discretion in preventing un-
qualified people from entering regulated professions pursuant to the 
state’s police power.27  A restriction based solely on an earlier convic-
tion, however, operates as both a commercial regulation and an addi-
 
 22. The double jeopardy clause, applied to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, prevents the government from putting individuals “in jeopardy of life 
or limb” twice “for the same offence.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 23. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
 24. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). 
 25. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010). 
 26. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Gandhi v. State Med. 
Examining Bd., 483 N.W.2d 295, 300–01 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).  
 27. See, e.g., Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999); Barry v. Barchi, 443 
U.S. 55, 61–62, 67–68 (1979); Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering & Cosmetology, 962 
F. Supp. 1260, 1271–72 (S.D. Cal. 1997). 
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tional penalty attaching to an ex-offender who has already been pun-
ished by a criminal sentencing court. 
These restrictions on employment are upheld so long as they are 
reasonable and not arbitrary.28  This means, at a bare minimum, the 
crimes should be reasonably related to the profession being regulat-
ed.29  The restrictions are not usually viewed as criminal penalties by 
the courts, but rather as civil penalties or regulations, which means 
they are not subject to the enhanced protections that the Constitution 
requires before imposing a criminal punishment.30  Courts defer to 
the legislature in making this determination, effectively giving the leg-
islature the ability to opt out of criminal procedure.31  The civil regu-
lation is then analyzed under rational basis review where it becomes 
almost impossible for an ex-offender to challenge.32 
Approximately 95% of convictions result from guilty pleas.33  But 
these convictions are vulnerable to challenges under due process and 
the Sixth Amendment.  Following reversal, the government is free to 
begin the prosecution again, but unavailable witnesses and missing 
evidence could effectively end the matter in the defendant’s favor.34  
Jurisprudence safeguards the finality of guilty plea convictions by 
minimizing the due process and Sixth Amendment duties of courts 
and defense attorneys. 
A guilty plea conviction satisfies due process when the defendant 
makes the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.35  The ulti-
 
 28. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 29. See Conn, 526 U.S. at 291–92; Barchi, 443 U.S. at 61–62, 67–68; Cornwell, 962 
F. Supp. at 1271–72.  
 30. Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and 
Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 9 (2005) (“The main relevant provisions are the Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Among 
these, the most important are the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which have 
been interpreted to require an elevated standard of proof (‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’) in criminal cases not applicable in civil cases (‘a preponderance of the evi-
dence’).”). 
 31. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99–100 (1997) (holding that defendant 
bears a heavy burden of showing a legislative decision to deny criminal procedures is 
unconstitutional if the legislature has chosen to label the punishment as civil). 
 32. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 124–25 (1978) (rejecting a 
substantive due process claim after applying rational basis review to an economic 
regulation with “little discussion”).  
 33. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,  Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, at 418 
(2005)). 
 34. See id. at 1496–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 35. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467–69 (1938). 
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mate responsibility for guarding against entry of involuntary pleas 
falls upon the judge receiving the plea.  The Sixth Amendment guar-
antees effective assistance of criminal defense counsel36 and charges 
defense attorneys with the duty to competently advise criminal de-
fendants considering whether to plead guilty.37  A criminal defendant 
who is not adequately informed or competently advised can therefore 
attack the criminal conviction itself.  Traditionally, the criminal de-
fense attorney is charged only with explaining the potential ramifica-
tions that a guilty plea may have on the ultimate sentence.  Counsel 
has not been required to explain the potential collateral consequences 
and, in reality, given the enormous number of statutes and regulations 
involved, counsel would have been hard pressed to identify the range 
of potential consequences for his client.38 
Collateral consequences can therefore be negatively defined as the 
civil penalties that result from criminal convictions that do not require 
advance notice to the defendant before he pleads guilty.  This defini-
tion, however, is wholly inadequate for the purpose of describing the 
phenomenon of collateral consequences and categorizing data within 
it.  Efforts to simplify the task by creating a positive definition require 
the omission of important elements.  For instance, collateral conse-
quences generally can be defined as those penalties not included in 
the originally-imposed criminal sentence.  This bright-line definition 
captures the vast majority of collateral consequences, but misses 
those occurring within the criminal sentence, such as parole eligibility 
and whether sentences are served concurrently, among others.  When 
we speak of collateral consequences in this article, therefore, we refer 
to those penalties resulting from a criminal conviction that are not 
part of the court-imposed sentence.  These penalties are generally 
considered civil in nature and do not include diversion programs, 
probation, or parole obligations.39 
 
 36. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984) (citing McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)). 
 37. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (applying Strickland to plea bargain-
ing). 
 38. See Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 
the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1097 (2004). 
 39. See, e.g., Adult Collateral Consequences Statute Demonstration Website, 
ABA, http://isrweb.isr.temple.edu/projects/accproject/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 30, 
2011) (providing snapshot of statutes in form that existed when collected by ABA 
Study between August 2009 and August 2010).    
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C. Addressing the Problems 
Despite their discriminatory effect, occupational collateral conse-
quences are sometimes necessary, provided they are fair and reason-
able.  For example, barring convicted burglars from occupations per-
formed in private residences or preventing child predators from 
seeking employment where they would likely have unsupervised con-
tact with children are fair and reasonable rules in light of the legiti-
mate public safety concerns they address.40  These concerns may be 
legitimate immediately after a person is released from prison.  For the 
vast majority of crimes, however, there is conceivably a point at which 
the conviction becomes irrelevant when determining whether to de-
cline to give an individual an employment opportunity based upon 
that conviction.  Some convictions remain relevant for a longer period 
of time and lawmakers are qualified to determine the length of those 
periods. Unfortunately, 90% of the statutes reviewed to date that 
contain collateral consequences fail to establish an expiration date 
and may therefore attach indefinitely. 
For example, in Michigan an individual may be forever barred 
from obtaining a fishing license after being convicted under the Natu-
ral Resource and Environmental Protection Act for catching a trout 
without an all-species license.41  The Act provides that following a 
conviction for this misdemeanor, “the court may . . . by order provide 
that the [fisher] shall not secure . . . licenses for . . . the remainder of 
[that] year . . . and during the next succeeding year, or longer in the 
discretion of the court.”42 
In Alabama, failure to operate a boat in a reasonable and prudent 
manner could result in an indefinite suspension of an operating li-
cense.43  The Alabama statute provides the criminal offense that may 
cause a revocation of the license, but it offers no guidance on the 
length of the suspension.  Therefore, the licensing body is authorized 
to revoke the license permanently if it sees fit. 
Undefined durations are not limited to minor recreational conse-
quences.  In Alabama, a medical professional who helps perform an 
 
 40. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., 21 § 2100.2 (West 2011) (“Any company en-
gaged in the business of ice cream truck vending shall conduct an annual name search 
against the Oklahoma Sex Offender Registry for each ice cream truck operator prior 
to allowing such person to engage in the business of ice cream truck vending in this 
state.”). 
 41. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 324.43559 (2011). 
 42. Id. 
 43. ALA. CODE § 33-5-70(d) (2011). 
GOWEN_CHRISTENSEN 3/9/2012  9:00 PM 
2011] COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 75 
abortion on a minor without parental consent can lose his or her li-
cense.44  Once again, the statute fails to state how long the revocation 
lasts, leaving it within the discretion of the regulatory body to deter-
mine whether the medical professional may ever return to his or her 
chosen occupation or whether the license revocation is permanent. 
When addressing regulations preventing ex-offenders from per-
forming a job, lawmakers should weigh several factors.  First, there 
should be a legitimate and articulated public safety concern calling for 
the restriction.  Second, lawmakers should tailor the restriction’s du-
ration and triggering crimes so that the restriction addresses the gravi-
ty and probability of the public safety concern without unnecessarily 
excluding people who are capable of doing the job, but do not pose a 
significant risk.  Third, lawmakers should balance the value of the re-
striction against the threat of recidivism that the state’s overall occu-
pational licensing regime poses. 
The following criteria should comprise the first steps toward creat-
ing a fair and just approach toward collateral consequences: 
1. First and foremost, the federal government and all state gov-
ernments should utilize studies, including the ABA study, that exam-
ine the collateral consequences that result from convictions under 
specific statutes. 
2. Legislators should review the statutes in their states and clarify 
the following areas: 
 a.  Any statute containing a collateral consequence should clear-
ly specify which crimes cause the consequence, exclude those crimes 
that are omitted, and prevent unelected governmental entities from 
expanding the scope of their own authority by applying the conse-
quence to unlisted crimes.45 
 b.  All statutes containing a collateral consequence should clari-
fy the terms of its duration or define the consequence as permanent.46 
3. Defense attorneys should be required to address collateral con-
sequences with their clients in the following ways: 
 
 44. Id. § 26-21-6. 
 45. Preferably, statutes should provide a direct citation to the offense to avoid 
confusion among similar criminal offenses. 
 46. Undefined durations ordinarily occur in the context of discretionary disquali-
fications.  While a discretionary decision maker can weigh the evidence and tailor an 
appropriate sanction for a particular ex-offender, these undefined periods can also 
give rise to permanent disqualifications where such consequences may not be appro-
priate.  Lawmakers who rely on discretionary decision makers should provide mini-
mum and maximum durations for the penalties that these agencies impose. 
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 a.  By asking questions during the initial client interview that 
are intended to identify potential consequences important to the cli-
ent. 
 b.  By consulting resources on collateral consequences, such as 
the ABA Study, and discussing the results with the client. 
4.  Finally, the courts should consider at least heightened rational 
basis review of penalties to determine whether the restriction is 
grounded in a legitimate and articulable public safety concern and 
whether the triggering crimes and duration of the penalty bear a rea-
sonable relationship to the gravity of the public safety concern and 
the probability that the restricted offender would cause the related 
harm. 
II.  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCE 
FEDERAL GRANT 
The ABA is in the process of gathering statutes and administrative 
regulations containing a collateral consequence, categorizing them 
based on their attributes, and determining which criminal offenses 
might subject an offender to a particular penalty.  ABA Criminal Jus-
tice Section Delegate Steven Saltzburg declared this the “most ambi-
tious project the ABA has ever undertaken.”47 
During the first few months, the team worked closely with Lex-
isNexis and a data development team to design a methodology to col-
lect and review the statutes containing collateral consequences in 
each state.  The methodology continues to be analyzed, revised and 
tested against published studies, such as the Minnesota, Arizona, and 
federal compilations.   
The statutes collected, with many containing multiple consequenc-
es, are now being reviewed by research attorneys through a process 
internally referred to as “coding.”  Coding consists of several steps, 
including a determination as to whether a consequence attaches au-
tomatically or requires a government entity to make a discretionary 
act, whether the consequence has a fixed, permanent, or undefined 
duration, and whether the statute specifies any mechanism for relief 
or an opportunity to appear. 
Finally, the attorneys search for crimes that would subject a person 
to the consequence following conviction.  This portion of the coding is 
complicated because many statutes ambiguously describe crimes ra-
 
 47. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Remarks at the ABA Criminal Justice Section Council 
Meeting (May 2010). 
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ther than citing them or explicitly naming them.  Some of these de-
scriptions are helpful, such as those specifying the particular element 
that triggers a consequence—for example, an offence containing an 
element of fraud.48  Others are more problematic, however, employ-
ing imprecise terms like “crimes involving moral turpitude.”49  
When a statute used non-specific language such as, “crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude,” the attorneys reviewed case law to determine 
how state courts have defined these phrases.  For example, North 
Carolina requires its chiropractic license applicants to demonstrate 
“good moral character.”50 
The final product of the study will be a freely accessible website al-
lowing visitors to submit a criminal statute and view a list of collateral 
consequences that may result from conviction.  It will also work in the 
reverse to display the crimes that may subject an offender to a specific 
penalty. 
The information resulting from the study will be valuable for any-
one involved in the criminal justice system, whether that person is a 
defense attorney, prosecutor, criminal defendant, lobbyist, or policy 
maker.  The ability to compare data between states is valuable for 
policymakers trying to determine how one state compares to the rest 
of the country.   
Additionally, the study will serve as an invaluable resource for his-
torians and social scientists studying how consequences change over 
time.  The federal government addressed a glaring flaw in the crimi-
nal justice system when it funded this study. Without proper mainte-
nance, however, the database will degrade if new and revised conse-
quences go uncollected.  The resource will lose its practical 
functionality if data becomes inaccurate. Therefore, it will be impera-
tive to properly maintain this resource with timely updates and con-
sistent coding standards. 
 
 48. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. Ann. § 10-6-108 (West 2011); N.Y. ENVTL. 
CONSERV. LAW § 27-1407 (McKinney 2011). 
 49. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7211.9 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 1-100b (West 2011); D.C. CODE § 3-509 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-1604 
(2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:2553 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644.1955 
(West 2011). 
 50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-143 (2011). 
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III.  IMPACT OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES ON 
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSURE: COSMETOLOGY LICENSE CASE 
STUDY 
To illustrate the discussion above, this section focuses on the col-
lateral consequences affecting the practice of cosmetology.  This case 
study demonstrates how consequences operate and the problems that 
state variations cause.  Generally, these sanctions may vary in discre-
tionary authority, the range of qualifying offenses, and the availability 
of relief. 
Cosmetology is the study of beauty treatment and includes special-
izations ranging from hairstyling to nail and makeup application.  
Although requirements vary slightly by state, applicants for a cos-
metology license must be at least sixteen years old, have a high school 
education, and have specialized training in cosmetology.51  Twenty-
five states impose collateral consequences applicable to cosmetolo-
gists.52 
The language of the statutes governing cosmetology licensing var-
ies dramatically by state.  For example, in Washington, D.C., the stat-
ute to revoke the license of a cosmetologist merely requires that the 
board or commission take into consideration “[t]he bearing, if any, 
the criminal offense or offenses for which the person was convicted 
will have on his fitness or ability to perform one or more such duties 
or responsibilities under the license.”53  In contrast, Wisconsin’s stat-
 
 51. See State Beauty License Requirements, BEAUTY SCHOOLS DIRECTORY, 
http://www.beautyschoolsdirectory.com/faq/state_req.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2011). 
 52. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-572 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-26-105 (2011); 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7403 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-8-132 (2011); 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-254 (2011); 24-3-3.1 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24 § 5107 (2011); D.C. 
CODE § 47-2853.12 (2011); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64B8-51.002 (2011); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 43-10-9 (2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-506 (2011); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 410/4-7 (West 2011); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 645-65.2 (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
65-1908 (West 2011); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 317A.050 (West 2011); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 37:354 (2011); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 5-314 (West 2011); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 339.1207 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. § 155A.27 (2011); Mo. 
Rev. Stat. § 329.050 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-31-304 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 644.1955 (West 2011); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R ANN. BAR § 301.01 (2011); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 45:5B-16 (West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-17A-21 (West 2011); N.Y. 
GEN. BUS. LAW § 410 (Consol. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §88B-24 (2011); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 43-11-31 (2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4709.07 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 59 § 199.11 (2011); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510 (West 2011); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 62-4-127 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-11a-302 (West 2011); W. VA. 
CODE R. § 3-1-4 (2011); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 454.06(1)(B) (West 2011); 10 GUAM 
CODE ANN. §§ 18113, 18129 (2010). 
 53. D.C. CODE § 47-2853.12 (2011). 
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ute provides that to receive a license, an applicant must prove that he 
or she has not been “convicted of a felony committed while engaged 
in the practice of barbering or cosmetology.”54 
One of the biggest problems with these consequences becomes ap-
parent when determining which crimes may trigger the penalty.  The 
majority of the state statutes reviewed leaves this triggering language 
vague and, therefore, open to broad interpretation and arbitrary en-
forcement. The most common language requiring an applicant to 
demonstrate “good moral character” uses the lack thereof as grounds 
for revocation or denial of a license.55  Other state statutes clarify the 
restriction with more precision.  States like Delaware and North Da-
kota may deny or revoke a cosmetology license to an applicant con-
victed of a crime related to the profession.56  Although more helpful 
than a “good moral character” requirement, these states are still 
vague in determining which crimes are related to the practice of cos-
metology.57  This ambiguity leads to unpredictable applications of col-
lateral consequences.  It also delegates substantial legislative power to 
the regulatory body to create additional penalties for criminal offens-
es by excluding them from a regulated profession. 
For example, what is the rationale behind prohibiting a hair stylist 
from pursuing his or her trade because he or she was convicted of 
driving under the influence?  In New Mexico, the court left open the 
possibility that a DUI could constitute a “crime of moral turpitude.”58  
Such broad discretion to exclude a person from a profession based 
solely upon a conviction under a poorly-defined statute should raise 
due process concerns because the statutes fail to adequately define 
and limit the consequence of criminal behavior. 
The vagueness of these statutes leaves applicants at the mercy of a 
licensing board and with little recourse to appeal an unfavorable rul-
ing.  Some states offer an opportunity for the applicant to appear be-
fore the regulatory authority and request reconsideration of an ad-
verse determination to appeal an unfavorable decision.  For example, 
in California, the cosmetology board is authorized to deny a license 
 
 54. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 454.06(1)(b) (West 2011). 
 55. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 317A.050 (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
45:5B-16 (West 2011); 63 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 510 (West 2011). 
 56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 5107 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE  § 43-11-31 (2011). 
 57. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 5107 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE  § 43-11-31 (2011). 
 58. In re Termination of Kibbe, 996 P.2d 419, 422–23 (N.M. 1999) (stating that a 
DUI in this case was not a crime of moral turpitude but that this finding “does not 
foreclose disciplinary action against a different employee in the future for similar 
conduct”). 
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based on a required criminal background check of an applicant.59  Al-
ternatively, in Louisiana, the state allows licensing board appeals to 
go through its Nineteenth District Judicial Court.60 
Although post-deprivational hearings and judicial review usually 
satisfy the minimum standards of due process when a government en-
tity regulates commercial activity, they offer little promise for the dis-
appointed applicant because of the deference afforded to the initial 
decision maker in these matters.  For example, California courts will 
only reverse an agency’s decision when the petitioner establishes by 
“substantial evidence” that an abuse of discretion has occurred.61 
Likewise, Louisiana courts decline to “interfere with the bona fide 
judgment of the Board [when supported by] substantial evidence” un-
less the complainant can show that the Board exceeded its constitu-
tional authority.62 
Determining the extent of an agency’s constitutional authority pre-
sents a challenge.  Regulatory bodies are often equipped with vague 
statutes creating penalties with undefined durations that are triggered 
by ambiguously-defined criminal activity.  Many of the cosmetology 
statutes require the applicant to demonstrate “good moral character.”  
This qualification works as both an undefined duration and a vague 
description of the criminal activity resulting in a sanction.  If the au-
thorizing statute is silent on duration, the board has no duty to revisit 
its decision at a later date.63  The profession of cosmetology may be 
forever closed to that individual.  In what amounts to an enormous 
delegation of legislative power, the agency effectively determines the 
scope of its own authority by interpreting these vague authorizing 
statutes and deciding which convictions demonstrate a lack of “good 
moral character” and for how long that presumption might apply.   
Finally, these interpretations enjoy considerable deference from 
the courts.  Under these circumstances, a complainant is hard-pressed 
to demonstrate an abuse of discretion when the agency claims that it 
 
 59. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7403 (West 2011). 
 60. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:607 (2011). 
 61. Matanky v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 144 Cal. Rptr. 826, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) 
(“Courts should pay great deference to the expertise of the administrative agency in 
determining the proper penalty to be imposed.” (citing Cadilla v. Bd. of Med. Ex-
am’rs, 103 Cal. Rptr. 455, 459 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972))). 
 62. Sciortino v. La. State Bd. of Cosmetology, 194 So. 2d 409, 411 (La. Ct. App. 
1967) (citing State ex rel. Rathe v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 19 So. 2d 153, 167–68 
(La. 1944)). 
 63. Lawmakers could address this problem by establishing a time limit on the ad-
missibility of prior convictions patterned after Federal Rule of Evidence 609(b). See 
FED. R. EVID. 609(b). 
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has the authority to sanction the complainant where it found a convic-
tion amounts to “substantial evidence” demonstrating the complain-
ant’s lack of “good moral character” and leaves that presumption in 
place for a disproportionate length of time. 
Ironically, some of the states with collateral consequences relating 
to the practice of cosmetology also provide cosmetology training 
through its correctional vocational programs.  Seven of the eighteen 
states reviewed offer cosmetology training in their prisons.  General-
ly, these programs promote a compelling public interest by providing 
employment opportunities to former convicts, thereby substantially 
reducing the likelihood of recidivism among those who find employ-
ment when released from custody.64  Illinois spends about $21 million 
annually for adult education in correctional facilities.65  A portion of 
that budget funds cosmetology training for inmates.66  Nevertheless, 
the Illinois cosmetology licensing board may never allow these people 
to put their training to use. It is authorized to revoke, suspend, or re-
fuse a cosmetology license to any person convicted of a felony, a mis-
demeanor involving an element of dishonesty, or a crime related to 
the profession.67  Without some guarantee that a trainee could obtain 
a license following release, Illinois taxpayers pay to teach offenders a 
job skill that may never be utilized.  The licensing board undermines 
the public good advanced by these vocational programs when it 
snatches the opportunity away from the trainee at the moment he or 
she attempts to re-enter society and is most vulnerable to recidivism.68 
 
 64. Michigan, which requires applicants to demonstrate “good moral character,” 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 339.1207 (West 2011), heard twenty cosmetology license 
appeals in 2009 following criminal conviction denials. See Cosmetology Board 
Minutes, Michigan Department of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, 
http://www.dleg.state.mi.us/dms/results.asp?docowner=BCSC&doccat=Cosmetology
&doctype=Meeting+Minutes (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
 65. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, 
ILLINOIS STATE BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2011), ch. 8 at 2, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/budget/FY2012/FY12_Operating_Budget.pdf; Dixon Correc-
tional Center, Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, http://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/ 
facilities/information.asp?instchoice=dix (last visited Nov. 2, 2011); Vienna Correc-
tional Center, ILL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, http://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/ 
facilities/information.asp?instchoice=vie (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
 66. OFFICE OF MGMT & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, ILLINOIS 
STATE BUDGET: FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2011), ch. 2 at 50, available at 
http://www.state.il.us/budget/FY2012/FY12_Operating_Budget.pdf (indicating por-
tion of budget directed toward vocational rehabilitation). 
 67. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 410/4-7 (West 2011). 
 68. In cases where the state legislature has established a vocational training pro-
gram for inmates teaching the skills of a particular occupation, courts should apply 
greater scrutiny when licenses are denied based on a conviction.  The state legislature 
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In some cases, consequences affecting employment are sound poli-
cy, such as when they limit an offender’s access to vulnerable popula-
tions or national security interests.  But for professions such as cos-
metology, the public safety concerns giving rise to these employment 
restrictions are outweighed by the danger and costs of recidivism cre-
ated by a systematic regime that denies employment opportunities to 
ex-offenders.  This is especially true where vague authorizing statutes 
without durational limits prevent an otherwise qualified candidate 
from the opportunity to earn an honest living.  In cases where an ex-
offender entered prison unskilled and enrolled in a vocational pro-
gram to learn a trade like cosmetology, these statutes may block that 
person’s only avenue to lawful and fulfilling employment. 
IV.  REDUCING AMBIGUITY IN THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE OF 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES 
Lawmakers should evaluate employment-related collateral conse-
quences and seek to clarify the relationship between the restrictions, 
the activity being regulated, and the public safety concern it address-
es.  They should also seek to clarify what criminal convictions may re-
sult in those restrictions.  Courts, for their part, should apply a 
heightened rational basis review to collateral consequences because 
of their relationship to criminal penalties and the danger that these 
agencies can effectively define the scope of their own authority. 
A. Application of Heightened Rational Basis Review for 
Collateral Consequences 
Courts should pay particular attention to the legitimate and articu-
lated public safety concerns asserted in authorizing statutes.  The 
gravity and probability of the public safety concern coming to fruition 
should be weighed against the risk that the restrictions are over-
inclusive, under-inclusive, vague, or grounded in animus towards the 
ex-offender.  Another factor should be whether an offender in the po-
sition of the applicant represents a greater public safety concern while 
unemployed than the applicant would represent if allowed to secure a 
license and seek employment in a lawful occupation.  These re-
strictions should be suspect when they disproportionally advance the 
purported public safety concern against the risk of an unreasonable 
 
has effectively spoken on the public safety concern that a convicted applicant repre-
sents assuming a particular occupation when it acts to train convicts to perform that 
job.  A contrary decision by an agency is in apparent conflict with the legislature’s 
policy on the matter. 
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application.  Pure animus toward ex-offenders without articulating a 
public safety concern is not a legitimate government interest and does 
not support scrutiny under a heightened rational basis review.  These 
individuals have paid their debt to society.  Alternatively, courts 
could recognize the inherently punitive nature of blanket criminal re-
strictions and review them for violations of constitutional protections 
such as double jeopardy and the ex post facto clause.69 
Under the law regulating plumbers in Rhode Island, a plumber 
may lose his license after a felony conviction that has virtually no re-
lationship to his regulated activity: 
The director of labor . . . shall revoke the license of any master 
plumber . . . or journeyperson plumber . . . after a hearing when the 
weight of the evidence establishes . . . any licensee . . . is convicted of 
a felony.70 
The broad implications of this statute means that if a person com-
mits a felony, such as promoting gambling by bookmaking at a race 
track,71 that person would be prevented from practicing his or her 
profession—even though the crime and the regulated activity are vir-
tually unrelated and the risk to public safety is exceedingly low.  
Here, it appears the restriction is over-inclusive, disproportionately 
severe compared to any articulable public safety concern, and appears 
to be based purely on animus towards convicted felons.  The court 
should require the legislature to articulate its public safety concerns 
relative to the criminal offenses it finds relevant.  Far too many crimes 
are classified as felonies to apply a single public safety concern to 
each of them identically. 
B. Reducing Ambiguity with Clear and Concise Language 
Lawmakers should ensure that statutory language is clear and un-
ambiguous to cabin the authority of regulatory agencies and to ensure 
that public safety concerns are being addressed without unnecessarily 
restricting opportunities to those who need them.  Generally, a stat-
ute is unconstitutionally vague as to violate due process when its lan-
guage fails to convey a sufficiently definite warning that certain con-
 
 69. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 325–26 (1866) (“[A]n ex post 
facto law is . . . one which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable 
at the time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then pre-
scribed; or changes the rules of evidence by which less or different testimony is suffi-
cient to convict than was then required.”). 
 70. R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-20-27 (2011). 
 71. Id. § 11-19-14.1. 
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duct is proscribed when “measured by common understanding and 
practices or where its language is such that people of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning.”72  Alarmingly, many 
statutes fail to identify specifically which crimes will cause a particular 
consequence.  Instead, many statutes rely on phrases without a specif-
ic legal definition. Judges may be competent to determine the mean-
ing of these phrases after the conduct has occurred and attorneys 
have briefed both sides of the question, but the same cannot be said 
of a “person of common intelligence” before the act or during plea 
negotiations for a crime such as bookmaking at a racetrack.  Phrases 
such as “good moral character,” “crimes of moral turpitude,” “violent 
crimes,” or “crimes against children” provide little guidance as to 
what crimes actually qualify.  Indeed, they often have no discernible 
relationship to the regulated activity. 
In Nebraska, the statute governing landscape architecture licenses 
states: 
Any applicant or landscape architect convicted of a felony, or other 
criminal offense, under state law, federal law or the law of another 
jurisdiction, and which if committed in this state would have consti-
tuted a felony under the state law, may be held in violation of the 
Code of Practice promulgated by the State Board of Landscape Ar-
chitects if, in the opinion of the Board, the events and circumstances 
leading to the conviction indicate a condition which would affect the 
competency of the registrant to serve the life, health, and property 
of the public.73 
Phrases like “a condition, which would affect the competency of 
the registrant to serve the life, health, and property of the public” 
provide no guidance in determining what crimes will prevent an ap-
plicant from registering with the board.  These vague qualifying 
phrases also make the job of a defense attorney trying to advise his 
client on a plea and the potential effects of conviction next to impos-
sible.  Given the broad authority delegated to the board, predicting 
the legal effect of a conviction is unworkable unless lawmakers explic-
itly cite the qualifying crimes and exclude the rest.  This clarification 
would give the public fair notice and reserve the exercise of this qua-
 
 72. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 972 & n.4 (2011) (citing Keyishian v. 
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Oc-
cupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 25 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir. 1994); 
Wotton v. Bush, 261 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1953); Trio Distrib. Corp. v. City of Albany, 143 
N.E.2d 329, 332 (N.Y. 1957); State v. Abner, 334 N.E.2d 530, 534–35 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1974)). 
 73. 231 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 8-005.05 (2011) (emphasis added). 
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si-criminal legislative function to the elected representatives in the 
state legislature. 
C. Providing Clear, Identifiable Expiration Dates for Penalties 
Additionally, statutory consequences should specify the duration of 
the restriction to better align the gravity and probability of the public 
safety concern with the prior conviction and balance it against the 
public harm that may result from the systematic marginalization of 
convicted persons.  To date, the vast majority of the statutes reviewed 
by the ABA team provide no expiration date, creating a presumption 
that these denials may be permanent. 
Although the initial marginalization of an ex-offender may benefit 
public safety, eventually such exclusion will result in diminishing and 
negative returns.  Ex-offenders are deprived of honest sources of in-
come, are systematically disenfranchised, and finally become burdens 
on the community by relying on welfare or engaging in recidivist 
criminal activity.  Determining the duration of an ex-offender’s stig-
matization should account for these diminishing and negative returns, 
as well as the risk of danger the ex-offender poses that prompted the 
restriction in the first place.  A recent study from Carnegie Mellon 
University shows that ex-offenders who go longer than three years 
without an additional arrest are no more likely than any other person 
to commit a crime.74  Providing expiration dates to the consequences 
will also motivate ex-offenders to wait out their suspension rather 
than return to criminal activity. 
V.  ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF DEFENSE 
ATTORNEYS 
A primary goal of the ABA study is to provide defense attorneys 
with a  tool for use in effectively counseling defendants who are con-
sidering guilty pleas.  When used as a source for information on po-
tential consequences, it may also allow attorneys to better craft plea 
agreements.  In the wake of Padilla v. Kentucky, the question remains 
of whether defense counsel is obligated to affirmatively advise clients 
on the broad range of collateral consequences outside the context of 
 
 74. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, “Redemption” in an Era of Wide-
spread Criminal Background Checks, 263 NIJ J. 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/226870.pdf (noting the correlation between the 
timeframe an ex-offender is likely to recidivate  depends on the age of the offender at 
the time of his first crime and the type of crime committed). 
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immigration.75  The Court’s shift in focus from “collateral” to “inte-
gral” provides an opportunity to re-examine obligations counsel has 
during the plea bargaining process—especially as it relates to advising 
clients about the potential collateral consequences of an offered 
plea.76 
With the aid of the ABA Study and other state and federal studies, 
defense counsel will have tools to use in working toward achieving 
the aspirations that Justice Stevens articulated in his Padilla opinion.  
With sources for systematic review, they will be aided in affirmatively 
advising clients of likely consequences of a particular conviction 
without creating an untenable burden for over-worked and resource-
deprived criminal defense attorneys.77  Accordingly, advising and 
consulting with clients regarding the collateral consequences of con-
viction will become not only preferable given the inherent duties in-
cumbent upon defense counsel and evolving norms of professional 
standards—it will be eminently practical. 
The role of defense counsel extends far beyond the narrow con-
fines of establishing guilt or innocence. Indeed, the ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice on the Function of Defense Counsel note “[t]he 
basic duty defense counsel owes to the administration of justice . . . is 
to serve as the accused’s counselor and advocate with courage and 
devotion and to render effective, quality representation.”78  An attor-
ney who ignores collateral consequences—which can often be more 
severe and enduring than criminal sentences—ignores a central com-
ponent of his duty to the accused.  These consequences not only af-
fect clients individually, but they also reach their families and society 
collectively.  Furthermore, when considering that 95% of criminal 
 
 75. Consider a recent Symposium entitled Padilla and the Future of the Defense 
Function, sponsored by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 
(NACDL) and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA), and co-
sponsored by the ABA Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Comprehensive Rep-
resentation Materials. 
 76. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat 
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117 (2011) (discussing Padilla’s 
acknowledgment of the importance of the plea bargaining process and advocating for 
further regulation); Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and 
Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675 (2011) (advocating for a 
professional standard of competence requiring affirmative advice as to collateral con-
sequences).  
 77. Chin, supra note 76, at 677–78. 
 78. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THIRD EDITION: PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, Standard 4–1.2(b) (1993) (emphasis added), 
available at http://americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_ 
standards/prosecution_defense_function.authcheckdam.pdf. 
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convictions are obtained through guilty pleas,79 counsel’s duty to 
competently advise clients on the likely consequences of those pleas is 
irrefutable. 
The plea negotiation does not exist in a vacuum of traditional crim-
inal sanctions.  Rather, the negotiation must account for and incorpo-
rate a clear analysis of the consequences and a strategy to mitigate 
them.  Recognizing this, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards on 
Pleas of Guilty instruct defense counsel to “determine and advise the 
defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any plea, as to the 
possible collateral consequences that might ensue from entry of the 
contemplated plea.”80  In light of the effects consequences have on an 
individual, and thus their role in the sentence itself, the ABA Stand-
ards for Criminal Justice on Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary 
Disqualification of Convicted Persons suggests that “[t]he legislature 
should authorize the sentencing court to take into account, and the 
court should consider, applicable collateral sanctions in determining 
an offender’s overall sentence.”81  Accounting for the importance and 
severity of consequences and recognizing their bargaining value in the 
plea negotiation process requires close communication with the client 
and affirmative advice.  Ethical and professional obligations mandat-
ing these practices are important steps towards achieving the goal of 
an integrated criminal defense.82 
Public defenders and legal services organizations have long exper-
imented with and advocated for an integrated approach to client rep-
resentation.83  Holistic defenders provide services designed to address 
 
 79. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Effective Assistance of 
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 698 & n.2 
(2002) (noting that “[m]ore than ninety percent of dispositions on the merits of crim-
inal prosecutions are convictions, and more than ninety percent of convictions result 
from guilty pleas” (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Source-
book of Criminal Justice Statistics 1999, at 432–33 tbl.5.32 (2000))); see also Bibas, 
supra note 79, at 103 & n.2 (observing that more than 95% of felony adjudications in 
state courts are resolved via guilty pleas (citing Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Sta-
tistics Online, Table 5.46.2004, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/ 
pdf/t5462004.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2011))). 
 80. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THIRD EDITION: PLEAS OF GUILTY, 
Standard 14.3.2(f) (1999). 
 81. ABA COLLATERAL SANCTIONS STANDARDS, supra note 5, standard 19-2.4. 
 82. For discussion on the topic of “integrated” or “holistic” defense, see McGreg-
or Smyth, Holistic Is Not a Bad Word: A Criminal Defense Attorney’s Guide to Us-
ing Invisible Punishments as an Advocacy Strategy, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 479 (2005). 
 83. See, e.g., The Center For Holistic Defense, a project of the Bronx Defenders, 
which proposes on its website that  
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substance addiction, mental health issues, immigration consequences, 
and even civil rights restoration.  These services compliment strict le-
gal advocacy by recognizing the additional factors clients struggle 
with in dealing with the criminal justice system.  Even among the pri-
vate defense bar, a client-centered focus will improve the quality of 
criminal defense representation.  The long experience and success of 
the holistic defense movement,84 combined with the availability of ef-
ficient research, should demonstrate that advising clients on collateral 
consequences is not as burdensome as some have argued. 
Effectively utilizing the ABA Study and other studies will require 
the defense attorney to implement a routine practice that includes 
gathering basic background information from a client and applying 
that knowledge to identify relevant consequences, as well as the goals 
and concerns of the client.  Gathering this information should include, 
at minimum, a set of intake questions designed to collect information 
about the client’s background and career ambitions and alert the at-
torney to significant and known potential consequences.85  It should 
also help guide the attorney’s discussions with the client to locate less 
notorious consequences that are of particular interest to the client.  
For instance, if counsel learns that the client holds any sort of occupa-
tional license, the attorney must consider the likely impact of a guilty 
plea on that license. The same holds true for issues regarding child 
custody, public housing eligibility, and benefits.  This information, to-
gether with research using such tools as the ABA Study, will substan-
tially reduce any perceived burden upon defense counsel while allow-
ing for an informed analysis of the most likely and relevant 
consequences a particular client will face.86 
 
[t]he key insight of holistic defense is that to be truly effective advo-
cates for our clients, we as defenders must broaden the scope of our 
work to include both the collateral consequences of criminal justice 
involvement as well as the underlying issues, both legal and non-
legal, that have played a part in driving our clients into the criminal 
justice system in the first place. 
What is Holistic Defense, CTR. FOR HOLISTIC DEF., http://www.holisticdefense.org/ 
what_is_holistic_defense/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
 84. See, e.g., Internal Exile: Collateral Consequences of Conviction in Federal 
Laws and Regulations, ABA COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS & PUB. 
DEFENDER SERV. FOR D.C. (Jan. 2009), http://www.pdsdc.org/Resources/Publication 
/Collateral%20Consequences%20of%20Conviction%20in%20Federal%20Laws%20
and%20Regulations.pdf. 
 85. Chin, supra note 76. 
 86. See Chin, supra note 76, at 690–91. 
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Asking a short list of questions can provide defense counsel with 
the information needed to identify important individual collateral 
consequences in a timely manner.87  The advantage of a tailored anal-
ysis over a static “cheat-sheet” is that the advice becomes affirmative 
and individualized, allowing the defendant to make an informed deci-
sion. At a minimum, the attorney should ask the following questions 
during the initial interview with the client: 
• How are you currently employed, or how do you currently 
earn a living? 
• Do you currently or are you likely in the future to reside in 
public housing? 
• Do you currently or are you likely in the future to receive 
food stamps or other benefits, such as unemployment or 
Social Security? 
• Are you a citizen of the United States? 
• Do you hold any licenses, permits or government contracts? 
• What are your goals for future employment? 
• Do you have any children, or do you serve as a foster par-
ent?88 
While it is impossible to provide advice as to every consequence 
that flows from any given conviction (and indeed to do so would re-
duce the meaningfulness of such advice in light of the overwhelming 
amount of information), focused questionnaires will enable practi-
tioners to identify and advise about likely consequences for any par-
ticular client. 
CONCLUSION 
When confronted with a potential plea, an in-custody client’s im-
mediate concern may well be securing the shortest jail or prison term 
possible.  However, as the conversation between client and attorney 
continues, that concern often immediately segues into questions re-
garding the impact on employment, housing, food stamps, and many 
other rights and benefits.  Moreover, a considerable number of crimi-
nal cases resolve with no actual imprisonment.  Often, individuals 
who have no significant criminal history will be offered probationary 
pleas as a matter of course—an option that a client, whether in or out 
of custody, will typically view as preferable to a “roll of the dice” at 
 
 87. See id. at 688–90. 
 88. These questions are adapted from Professor Chin’s work, but are phrased 
somewhat differently and omit references to firearms. 
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trial.89  Rolling the dice, however, may in fact be a better option con-
sidering the consequences that may soon follow. 
This analysis does not obviate the need to advise generally about 
the comprehensive and broad-reaching consequences that the entry 
of a guilty plea may trigger.90  But overall, the use of the ABA’s con-
sequences database in conjunction with a client-centered analysis will 
make the affirmative advice regarding collateral consequences a prac-
tical and achievable task.  When the ABA Study becomes available to 
the public, it will aid in lessening the burden on defense attorneys of 
providing this information, and will assist them in fulfilling their pro-
fessional duty to render affirmative advice regarding collateral conse-
quences.91 
 
 
 89. This is especially true if the client must remain in custody pending the trial. 
 90. See Chin, supra note 76, at 688–90. 
 91. Id. 
